Search results for "arabialainen filosofia"

Ma‘dûle Önermelerde Varlıksal İçerik Sorunu: Fahreddin er-Râzî-Kutbüddin et-Tahtânî Tartışması

2019

This paper addresses discussions in post-Avicennan Arabic logic on the definition of metathetic propositions and their status in relation to existential import requirements, focusing on the arguments made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and the counter-arguments by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365), who both establish their positions in the framework drawn by the most prominent figure in the tradition of classical Arabic logic, Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037). In the latter’s works, the problem of the existential import requirement in metathetic propositions (ma‘dūla) are thoroughly discussed and Avicenna seems to have presumed the existential import as a truth-condition f…

Iʿtibārī Concepts in Suhrawardī : The Case of Substance

2020

Abstract Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) famously criticised the central concepts of Avicennian metaphysics as merely mind-dependent (or iʿtibārī) notions. This paper aims to show that despite his critique, Suhrawardī held that these concepts are meaningful, indeed necessary for human cognition. By the same token, it is argued that their re-emergence in Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī metaphysics is not a matter of incoherence. Although the paper’s findings can be generalised to hold of all iʿtibārī concepts, mutatis mutandis, our focus is on the concept of substance, mainly because of the importance of the concept of ‘dusky substance’ in ishrāqī metaphysics.

The Influence of the Avicennan Theory of Science on Philosophical Sufism

2020

Abstract This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy in this case—…

The Question of Providence and the Problem of Evil in Suhrawardī

2021

Abstract Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī’s philosophical works seem to contain two conflicting views on providence: in the Talwīḥāt and the Mašāriʿ, he endorses the Avicennian view, only to deny providence altogether in the Ḥikmat al-išrāq. This contribution aims to explain the seeming inconsistency by investigating it in light of the underlying question of God’s knowledge of particular things. I will also argue that despite his qualms concerning providence, Suhrawardī accepts the closely related Avicennian answer to the problem of evil.

On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna

2020

This paper addresses two questions related to Themistius’ alleged influence on Avicenna’s theory of the common sense. The first question concerns the phenomenon of incidental perception, which Themistius explained by means of the common sense. For Avicenna, on the contrary, the explanation of cases like our perceiving something yellow as honey involves the faculty of estimation and the entire system of the internal senses that he coined, and this results in an analysis that is considerably more complex than Themistius’. The second question concerns Themistius’ claim according to which an incorporeal spirit is the primary subject of perception. I argue that Avicenna departs from such a view …

The Flying and the Masked Man, One More Time: Comments on Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich, ‘The Thought Experimental Method: Avicenna's Flying Man A…

2020

AbstractThis is a critical comment on Adamson and Benevich (2018), published in issue 4/2 of the Journal of the American Philosophical Association. I raise two closely related objections. The first concerns the objective of the flying man: instead of the question of what the soul is, I argue that the argument is designed to answer the question of whether the soul exists independently of the body. The second objection concerns the expected result of the argument: instead of knowledge about the quiddity of soul, I claim the argument yields knowledge about the soul's existence independently of the body. After the objections, I turn to the masked man fallacy, claiming that although the Adamson-…

Kirjan Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond esittely

2018

Teksti luonnehtii lyhyesti islamilaisen filosofian tutkimuksen nykytilaa sekä esittää tiivistelmän symposiumissa käsiteltävän kirjani keskeisestä sisällöstä. nonPeerReviewed

Illumination

2020

"Not So Ridiculous" : Avicenna on the Existence of Nature (tabi'a) contra Aristotle and the Ash'arites

2019

In this paper, I set out to explicate what I take to be a distinctive argument that Avicenna offers for the existence of nature (ṭabī ͑a) as a causal power (quwwa) in bodies (ajsām). In doing this, I first clarify the philosophical and historical context of the argument, showing that its two main targets were the Aristotelian tradition on the hand and the Ash ͑arite theological (kalām) tradition on the other. With regards to the Aristotelian tradition, which took the existence of nature as a given, I show that the shaykh departs from it in this regard for at least two reasons. The first has to do with a certain feature of how Avicenna conceptualized, consistent with the Aristotelian traditi…

Freedom and responsibility in Avicenna

2022

It is still a matter of some debate whether Avicenna grounds moral responsibility in a robust notion of free will. In this contribution, I will first delve into Avicenna’s theory of voluntary agency, arguing that he holds voluntary agency to be responsive to reasons but also thoroughly determined by the agent’s beliefs concerning the relevant goals, instruments, and qualifying circumstances. Since these beliefs in turn are caused, it seems that there is little room for a causally undetermined will in Avicenna’s theory. I will conclude by considering the question of whether Avicenna is some kind of compatibilist concerning the relation between determinism and responsibility. peerReviewed